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ABSTRACT 
Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and 
documented phenomenon that defeats system 
redundancy. CCFs are a set of dependent type of failures 
that can be caused for example by system environments, 
manufacturing, transportation, storage, maintenance, and 
assembly.  Since there are many factors that contribute to 
CCFs, they can be reduced, but are difficult to eliminate 
entirely.   Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail 
to differentiate between independent and dependent CCF.  
Because common cause failure data is limited in the 
aerospace industry, the Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA) Team at Bastion Technology Inc. is estimating 
CCF risk using generic data collected by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC).  Consequently, common 
cause risk estimates based on this database, when applied 
to other industry applications, are highly uncertain. 
Therefore, it is important to account for a range of values 
for independent and CCF risk and to communicate the 
uncertainty to decision makers.  
There is an existing methodology for reducing CCF risk 
during design, which includes a checklist of 40+ factors 
grouped into eight categories. Using this checklist, an 
approach to produce a beta factor estimate is being 
investigated that quantitatively relates these factors.  In 
this example, the checklist will be tailored to space launch 
vehicles, a quantitative approach will be described, and an 
example of the method will be presented. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
CCF is a known and documented phenomenon that can 
occur due to coupling factors that result in multiple 
dependent failures of identical components in a redundant 
design configuration. Consequently, if not understood, 
identified, and mitigated these factors limit the benefit of 
system redundancy as a design approach to achieve high 
reliability. Because of their extremely high cost, low 
launch rate, and national reputation, the public expects 
and demands reliable launch vehicle operation and 
mission success. To achieve high reliability, design 
engineers employ functional redundancy in the design to 
achieve reliability goals.  The success of this design 
approach requires steps be taken during system design 
and throughout the system lifecycle to limit and reduce 
CCF. An important step toward this end is to implement 
a deliberate and documented procedure throughout the 
design, development, and operational life of the system to 
understand and mitigate coupling factors that can result in 
CCFs. Failure to actively pursue these steps may result in 
highly redundant configurations with added cost, 
complexity, and weight that also fail to achieve their 
reliability goals.  Furthermore, reliability prediction 
methodologies that do not address CCFs significantly 
misrepresent the true reliability of a system that relies on 
redundancy.  
Another related issue that is a source of uncertainty in 
predicting design reliability of launch vehicles is sparse 
data. Also, problem reporting databases, when they are 
implemented and maintained, typically do not record 
operating time and other information that makes it 
difficult to accurately predict system reliability. Even less 
common are documented proximate and root cause 
analyses to identify whether coupling factors may have 
contributed to the failure or precursor to failure. Our 
experience in reviewing failures and anomalies suggests 
that CCFs have often not been identified as such.  
A generic common cause failure database maintained by 
the Nuclear Regulatory Agency is being used by the 
Bastion Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) team to 
estimate the risk of CCF for launch vehicles. Without 
investigating details of the specific system, these generic 
CCF factors may grossly under estimate the magnitude of 
the risk if these estimates are not adjusted to reflect 
significant differences in other industry applications [1]. 
An accepted methodology for reducing CCF is a CCF 
checklist to help PRA analysts identify common cause 
coupling factors and to use the insights gained to improve 
the quantitative CCF estimate [2].  The checklist is an aid 
to judging the overall susceptibility of the system to CCF 
of coupling mechanisms with specific qualities of the 
system. As technology advances and new system designs 
achieve higher levels of reliability, it is imperative that 
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procedures to reduce common cause are implemented 
early in the development cycle.  
If steps are not taken to actively reduce CCFs through 
process, training, and design, the occurrence of CCFs may 
be significantly higher than the estimates documented in 
the NRC for the nuclear industry. According to a 
published paper [1], other industries have in fact 
experienced significantly higher occurrence of common 
cause failure. 
There exists a need to link the magnitude of CCF risk to 
system qualities and to communicate the qualities that 
affect CCF. The systems analysis methodology detailed 
in this paper produces CCF estimates, based on an 
examination of the qualitative standards specific to the 
industry or system being analyzed as a first step to 
modeling CCF risk when no data on CCF exists.  Before 
discussing the method, it is necessary to provide a review 
of the basic CCF calculation to show how this method 
may improve this CCF risk estimate compared to an 
unexamined application of generic data from the NRC. 
2. BASIC COMMON CAUSE 
CALCULATION 
As defined in the NASA PRA procedures guide [2] 
Section 7.3:  
 
A common cause failure event is defined as the 
failure (or unavailable state_ of more than one 
component due to a shared cause during the system 
mission. Viewed in this fashion, CCFs are 
inseparable from the class of dependent failures 
and the distinction is mainly based on the level of 
treatment and choice of modeling approach in 
reliability analysis. 
 
There are a number of different methods for modeling 
CCFs and estimating the effect on system reliability such 
as the Multiple Greek Letter, the Alpha Model, and the 
Beta-Factor model.  The beta-factor model is one of the 
simplest methods for modeling the impact of CCF and 
will be the focus of discussion in this paper. 
 
To show how the beta factor estimates CCF risk, it is 
applied to a simple redundant system with two identical 
components in parallel in which at least one out of two is 
required to work. It is assumed that the total failure 
probability consists of independent and common cause 
failures. In this example, the total failure rate is equal to 
the sum of the independent failure rate and the common 
cause failure rate. 
 
𝜆𝑇 = 𝜆𝐼 + 𝜆𝑐𝑐 
 
While assuming that cc < I. 
 
A factor, , is defined as the fraction of the total failure 
rate due to common cause. From this relationship, the 
independent failure rate (𝜆𝐼) can be calculated. 
 
𝛽 =
𝜆𝑐𝑐
𝜆𝑇
 
 
𝜆𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝜆𝑇 
 
𝜆𝐼 = (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝑇 
 
 
Figure 1: System Failure calculation including CCF 
 
The total failure probability (or failure rate) can be taken 
from failure databases or testing. By assuming or 
estimating a  the failure probability of the parallel 
system is calculated as:  
 
𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 = (𝜆𝐼𝑡)
2 + (𝜆𝑐𝑡) = 
 
= [(1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝑇𝑡]
2 + 𝛽𝜆𝑇𝑡 
 
Assume t = 1E-3 (failures/hr), t = 1 hour,  = 0.1 
 
             = [1E-03*(1E-03)*1]2 + 0.1*1E-03*1 
 
The first term is the independent failure contribution and 
second term is the CCF contribution, which is equal to: 
 
=8.1E-03 + 1.0E-01. 
 
Even when cc is much less than I (and  is less than 
0.1) it shows that the CCF risk estimate dominates 
system risk. In addition, the  is the main driver of the 
overall system risk estimate. 
 Again, most databases only track total failures and make 
no distinction between independent and CCF.  The NRC 
estimates for a range of generic component groups vary 
CCF  from 5-10% of total failures.  From the same 
study cited earlier [1], failure data showed CCFs in some 
industries as high as 33% of total failures.  This shows 
the importance of estimating a  that accounts for 
specific qualities of the system being modeled for CCF.  
 
We have established the basics of estimating CCF risk 
and have shown how important the  is to the CCF 
estimate. We now will review factors that contribute to 
this phenomenon. 
 
3. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO 
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE 
There are a set of primary factors that are significant 
contributors to CCFs and are described by eight areas that 
effect CCF coupling mechanisms: 
1. Separation/segregation 
2. Diversity/ redundancy 
3. Complexity/maturity of design/experience 
4. Use of assessments/ analysis and feedback data 
5. Procedures/ human interface (e.g. 
maintenance/testing) 
6. Competence/ training/ safety culture 
7. Environmental control (e.g., temperature, 
humidity, personnel access) 
8. Environmental testing 
 
1. Separation/segregation:  
This first group is the most often quoted factor associated 
with CCFs. Redundant subsystems in close proximity can 
be susceptible to the same faults. Keeping systems 
segregated helps limit these common cause coupling 
factors. A famous example is a fire or a leakage that 
causes corrosion.  There is a famous example of an early 
flight of the DC-10 which failed to separate multiple 
redundant hydraulic controls is well documented in the 
literature. [Wetherholt paper]: 
  An actual example demonstrating single physical 
point failure is the case of United Airlines Flight 
232 which was flying from Denver, Colorado to 
Chicago-O’Hare. On July 19, 1989 on the DC-10, 
the number 2 engine (on the tail of the plane) 
experienced a failure which threw shrapnel into 
the hydraulic lines passing through a 10 inch wide 
channel in the tail. All three redundant hydraulic 
systems lost fluid, leading to loss of flight control 
surface actuation. 
This should make it clear that the more 
separation/segregation of redundant components can be 
achieved the less this factor influences CCFs. However, 
there are limits to how much separation can be achieved 
— separated for systems that are tightly constrained by 
volume limitations, such as in aerospace applications. 
2. Diversity/ Redundancy: the more diverse the 
better in regards to the design and maintenance of 
redundant subsystems. It is important to examine whether 
redundant systems were developed from separate 
requirements, by distinctly different design groups, with 
independent testing and design verification teams. 
Common cause coupling is decreased by adding more 
diversity. 
 
3. Complexity/maturity/experience: A complex 
design with many components makes discovering 
coupling factors more difficult.  The maturity of the 
design, along with testing off-nominal situations that 
stress the system, will bring coupling factors to light. The 
amount of experience designers/operators/maintainers 
have with a redundant system will also affect the common 
cause coupling factors and the overall susceptibility to 
CCF. 
 
Analysis and feedback data: The more analysis 
methods, data tracking, and feedback to the program that 
is done the better the control/reduction of CCF will be for 
a given system. Some of the questions to be addressed in 
this category are: Has a detailed Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis been completed?  Is there an active 
problem reporting and analysis program for the system?  
Has a comprehensive reliability allocation and risk 
assessment been completed?  Is root cause analysis 
performed after the occurrence of a system fault or 
failure?  Are these analyses and data effectively 
communicated to the design engineers and management, 
and are these insights used to make the appropriate 
changes in the design, operational procedures, and 
training programs? Analysis and data feedback 
effectively used to improve the system can reduce 
common cause failure coupling factors. 
4. Procedures/human interface: This aspect of 
CCF covers operation and maintenance as regarding 
human interfaces. Some of the questions to be addressed 
in this category are: Are there specific maintenance 
procedures for diverse/redundant systems/components 
that suggest a staggered or non-staggered approach? Are 
maintenance actions and faults documented and 
investigated with respect to other redundant 
systems/components. Do maintenance manuals address 
possible common-cause coupling factors, for example 
assuring components are separated in case of a 
cable/connections re-routing.  Is diverse equipment 
maintained by different shifts of staff? Are procedures 
updated after failure investigations?  Is personnel training 
modified and updated following failure investigation 
findings? 
 
 
5. Competence/training/culture: The safety 
culture plays a role in reducing CCFs. Some of the 
questions to be addressed in this category are: Have 
designers been trained to understand CCF? Do designers 
have a variety of technical background and experience?  
Does the industry put an emphasis on increasing 
reliability and safety?  Have installers and maintenance 
personnel been trained to understand CCF? Have 
maintenance personnel been trained to understand CCF?  
Are maintenance personnel periodically retrained and 
updated on the results of failure assessments? 
 
6. Environmental control: The environment itself 
can cause or initiate CCF mechanisms. Some of the 
questions to be addressed in this category are: Is the 
environment adequately controlled and regulated? Will 
the system encounter extreme environments?  How will 
the system respond to localized, rare, extreme events? 
(E.g. earthquakes, flooding, loss of power from grid, etc.) 
 
7. Environmental testing: Some of the questions 
to be addressed in this category are: Has the system been 
tested for the environmental conditions in which it 
operates (e.g. extended low or high temperatures, salt 
spray, vibration, etc.)? Has the system response been 
tested for electro-magnetic radiation?  
 
Now that the eight areas that affect CCFs have been 
described, the next step is to present the methodology for 
developing a quantitative estimate of . 
4. BASIC METHODLOGY FOR 
ESTIMATING BETA FACTOR 
REALATED TO EIGHT COMMON 
CAUSE CATEGORIES 
 
The first step in estimating the common cause beta factor 
is to assume a Maximum Common Cause Value (MCCV). 
One of three possible values must be selected (10%, 20%, 
or 30%). MCCV is based on judgment and experience and 
represents the maximum industry beta value based on a 
number of root cause considerations particular to the 
industry, such as its safety culture, management 
effectiveness, budget and schedule constraints, training 
effectiveness, maintenance program, and industry failure 
history. For example, in an industry that has a strong 
safety culture compared to other industries, one might 
select the lowest level of MCCV = 10%. Other industries 
that have a poor safety culture might have the highest 
MCCV = 30%. 
The next step is assess each of the eight common cause 
susceptibility categories and for each, assign a 
Susceptibility Score of 1, 5, or 10 corresponding to  the  
susceptibility category of Low, Medium, or High, 
respectively.  The total Common Cause Score (CCS) is a 
sum of the products calculated by multiplying the number 
of categories (Nlow, Nmedium, Nhigh) assigned to each score 
by its Susceptibility Score. 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑆 = 1 ∙ N𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 5 ∙ N𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 + 10 ∙ Nℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 
 
The maximum possible CCS score with 8 high categories 
is T = 80. Then the CCF Beta is calculated as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐹 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 =
𝐶𝐶𝑆
𝑇
× 𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑉 
 
For Table 1 given below with all low Susceptibility 
Scores, CCS=8, T=80, MCCV=30% 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐹 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 =
8
80
× .30 =  3%, 
 
Table 1: basic evaluation for CCF with all low values 
 
 
This, incidentally would be the minimum CCF Beta this 
method allows using this assumed MCCV. 
5. INDUSTRY EXAMPLE #1:  STRONG 
SAFETY CULTURE  
 
Now that the basis of the methodology has been 
described, we next apply it to an industry with a strong 
safety culture to illustrate how the result compares to the 
generic database values.  
 
MCCV for this industry is assumed to be 20% since this 
industry makes an effort to reduce common cause failures. 
 
 
Separation/segregation: This industry has successfully 
applied this design principle by physically separating 
redundant components; therefore. This is judged this 
factor to be low for common cause. 
 
Diversity/ Redundancy: This example industry uses 
functional redundancy and diversity in the design, and 
also ensures diversity in maintenance procedures (for 
example, by having written maintenance procedures that 
require different maintenance operators checking out 
redundant subsystems, or by staggering the testing of 
redundant subsystems).  In general, this industry is aware 
of CCFs. However, most designs in this example industry 
are 40 or more years old, and since not much was known 
about CCF during early design, this is judged to be 
medium. 
 
Complexity/maturity/experience: By its nature 
Example #1 industry is complex. It is also decades old 
with many years of operating experience and is subject to 
strict government oversight and regulation. This is judged 
to be medium. 
 
Analysis and feedback data: Example #1 industry also 
collects and maintains extensive data on CCF multiple 
plants and many years of operating experience as required 
by its government’s regulatory agency. This is judged to 
be a low contributor to CCF. 
 
Procedures/human interface: The regulatory agency 
overseeing this industry’s design and maintenance 
procedures expend resources to minimize CCFs.  The 
agency also oversees industry operators to ensure 
procedures meet exceedingly well defined standards. This 
is judged to be a low contributor. 
 
Competence/training/culture: The oversight agency 
regulating this industry requires operators to have specific 
training. In addition, the agency monitors and strictly 
enforces standards. 
 
Environmental control: The plant operating 
environment within this industry is well controlled. This 
would be assumed to be low factor for CCF. However, 
other environmental factors include extreme weather and 
natural disasters (such as Earth quakes and floods) that 
raises this to medium. 
 
Environmental testing: This industry expends 
significant effort in testing for environmental conditions 
such as rare weather and disaster events (i.e. earthquakes) 
for the design basis risk.  Procedures and failure studies 
are conducted and published industry wide to disseminate 
information.  This is judged to be a low contributor to 
CCFs. 
 
These results are summarized in Table 2 below 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐹 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 =
𝐶𝐶𝑆
𝑇
× 𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑉 
 
So for the table given below, CCS=20, T=80, and 
MCCV=20%. 
 
Area Low Medium High
Separation/segregation x
Diversity/ Redundancy x
Complexity/maturity/experience x
Analysis and feedback data x
Procedures/human interface x
Competence/training/culture x
Environmental control x
Environmental testing x
sum of x's 8 0 0
Scoring 1 5 10
x * scoring 8 0 0
CCS
Total of x * scoring 8
Table 2: CCF Example #1 Evaluation  
 
 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐹 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 =
20
80
× .20 =  5%, 
 
This methods estimates the generic CCF beta for this 
example industry at 5%. 
6. EXAMPLE #2 POOR SAFETY CULTURE 
In this hypothetical example, the industry has a poor 
safety record, operations are very hazardous, the working 
environmental conditions are harsh, and government 
oversight is not as intense as in example #1. For this 
industry, MCCV is assumed to be 30% since it has not 
made a significant effort to reduce common cause 
failures. 
 
  
Separation/segregation: The physical working 
environment is somewhat limited, but relatively large 
compared to other systems, such as spacecraft. With 
careful design consideration, redundant systems can be 
adequately separated/segregated. However, the industry 
lacks awareness of CCF and historically has valued cost 
savings more than safety.  Therefore this is deemed, for 
current industry standards, as a high contributor to CCFs. 
 
Diversity/ Redundancy: Where system redundancy is 
present the focus is on demanding production goals rather 
than safe operations. Without more specific information 
or design details, this is judged to be medium. 
 
Complexity/maturity/experience: This industry has 
made significant advances in technology and performance 
in the last two decades without associated increases in 
safety measures. With a poor record of compliance with 
respect to government regulations and a limited number 
of on-site government inspectors compared, this category 
is a high contributor to CCFs. 
 
Analysis and feedback data: While some effort is made, 
no specific government regulation or oversight is made 
for detailed analysis or use of feedback data.  In addition, 
competition between companies means data is not shared 
among industry participants.  Lastly, different companies 
have different levels of analysis. This is judged to be high 
contributor to CCFs. 
 
Procedures/human interface: This industry requires 
extensive human interface and experience.  Many 
processes should be well documented and require many 
work intensive steps.  This makes this a high contributor 
to CCFs. 
 
Competence/training/culture: The standards in this 
industry require a high level of competence.  Training 
requirements vary among companies but still maintain a 
certain level.  Culture varies among the different 
companies.  This is judged to be a medium contributor to 
CCFs. 
 
Environmental control: Depending upon the operating 
location, environmental conditions range from mild to 
extreme.  Typically, the environment is harsh and 
working conditions are extremely difficult. This is 
assumed to be a medium contributor to CCFs. 
 
Environmental testing: The harsh environments should 
require more testing for hardware and system processes.  
This one is estimated to be a medium contributor to CCFs. 
 
These results are summarized in the Table 3 below 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐹 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 =
𝐶𝐶𝑆
𝑇
× 𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑉 
 
So for the table given below, CCS=60, T=80, and 
MCCV=30%. 
 
Area Low Medium High
Separation/segregation x
Diversity/ Redundancy x
Complexity/maturity/experience x
Analysis and feedback data x
Procedures/human interface x
Competence/training/culture x
Environmental control x
Environmental testing x
sum of x's 5 3 0
Scoring 1 5 10
sum of x * scoring 5 15 0
CCS
Total of x * scoring 20
Table 3: Example #2 CCF Example Evaluation  
 
 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐹 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 =
60
80
× .30 =  23%, 
 
This methods estimates the generic CCF beta this 
example industry at 23%. 
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Systems require ever higher levels of reliability and in 
many cases this is achieved by increase redundancy.  
Without care, increasing redundancy may lead to 
increased CCFs coupling thereby reducing the benefit of 
increased system reliability. Until more data is collected 
and analyzed it will be difficult to judge just how high 
CCF risk is. However, using generic data, which are 
specifically designed to reduce common cause 
mechanisms, leads one to suspect that other industries 
may grossly underestimate CCF risk and also 
significantly overestimate system reliability. 
 
We have reviewed the  factor CCF model and shown 
how it effects overall system reliability and how 
important that it in reliability predictions.  We have 
provided a methodology that relates eight areas of 
susceptibility to common cause coupling factors to the  
estimate.  We then assessed the common cause  for two 
example industries: Example #1 Strong Safety Culture 
and Example #2 Poor Safety Culture and in both cases 
estimated reasonable  values based on data assumed to 
be known through an examination of eight factors that 
contribute to common cause failure. 
 
Much work has been done to detail the factors that affect 
CCFs. By using this proposed method there is a better 
justification for generic CCF based on these factors that 
may lead to more realistic or credible CCF risk and overall 
system reliability when system specific data is not 
available.  These results can then be used to highlight 
system design details that could investigated to reduce the 
system’s susceptibility to CCF before data can be 
collected and investigate specifically to reduce CCF. 
 
This method serves two purposes: 1) allows an analyst to 
better model CCF with factors specific to a system that 
doesn’t have CCF data, and; 2) better communicate CCF 
coupling mechanisms to system designers, operators and 
maintainers.  The more effort to educate industries about 
CCF coupling mechanisms, the more systems can be 
made that reduce CCF in the future. 
 
 
 
Area Low Medium High
Separation/segregation x
Diversity/ Redundancy x
Complexity/maturity/experience x
Analysis and feedback data x
Procedures/human interface x
Competence/training/culture x
Environmental control x
Environmental testing x
sum of x's 0 4 4
Scoring 1 5 10
x * scoring 0 20 40
CCS
Total of x * scoring 60
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